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IN THE SUPRD1E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COMMON CAUSE OF UTAH, an 
unincorporated association 
by t1ARJOR IE J. THDriAS, on 
behalf of its members and 
tlARJOR IE J. THQr.1AS, an 
individual, 
Respondents-Plaintiffs, 
-v-
UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE CDr1t~IS­
SION and MILLY 0. BERNARD, 
OLOF E. ZUNDEL, and KEN-
NETH RIGTRUP, in their 
capacities as Commissioners 
of the UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION, real parties in 
interest, 
Appellants-Defendants, 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY 
C01·1PANY , intervenor. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
CASE NO. l 5685 
This is an appeal by defendants' (hereinafte;- appellants) 
from an Order of the Third Judicial District Court, The Honorable 
Peter F. Leary, District Judge, granting respondents' ~1otion for Sum-
mary Judgment on all issues and denying appellants' Motion for Summary 
J11dgment in accordance with the orders and memoranda of the Court filed 
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on January 4, 1978, and January 5, 1978, and judo:,,ent entered in 
favor of respondents and against appellant·:,, dated January 23, 1978, 
declaring the Utah Public Service Commission to be subject to the Open 
and Public ~1eeti ngs' Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 52-4- l , ~-, 
when said Commission deliberates, votes upon, establishes, or otherwise 
evaluates existing or proposed public utility rates, tolls and charges, 
rentals or classifications. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the Order of the Third Judicial 
District Court and a declaration of this Court that the Utah Public Ser-
vice Cor:linissim·, is !1~~ required to deliberate, vote upon, establish or 
-;,,'! J!' proposed public utility rates, tolls, charges, 
rentals or classifications in open public meetings, pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 52-4-l, ~-
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties hereto have stipulated to the following facts which 
were taken as true for the purposes of the lower court's action: 
l. Appellant Public Service Commission admitted that 
the Legislature has the power and authority to 
set and determine utility rates, and that such power 
and authority have been delegated to the Utah Public 
Service Commission. 
2. Appellant Public Service Commission admitted that it 
is a "public body" ~1hich conducts "meetings" as those 
terms are defined in the Open and Public Meetings' Act. 
Section 52-4-l, ~-
3. Appellant Public Service Commission admitted that re-
spondents and the general public are excluded from those 
-2-
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meetings of the Public Service Commission, wherein 
the commissioners deliberate and vote upon the set-
t!ng oF rates b~t deny that respondents or the pub-
llc have any r1ght to attend such meetings. 
4. Appellant Public Service Commission asserted that any 
requirement that the Commission deliberate and vote 
upon the setting of rates in public is unconstitutional 
and a violation of the due process provision of the 14th 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and 
Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution. 
5. That if the respondents, or either of them, requested 
permission from the Commission, or any of the Commissioners 
thereof, to attend any of the deliberative sessions de-
scribed in paragraph (3) above, such request would be 
denied. 
6. The parties stipulated that the exemptions to the require-
ments of the Open and Public Meetings' Act contained in 
Section 52-4-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, 
are not in issue in this action. 
Respondents seek only to establish that the Utah Open and Public 
Meetings' Act applies to the Public Service Commission "only when that 
body is establishing utility rates." TR-200 (p.24) The Lower Court re-
ceived a copy of the Commission's Rules of Practice and Procedure which 
contain references to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and also the Utah 
Rules of Evidence. (P.62) (TR-238) 
Appellant Public Service Commission regularly conducts proceedings 
upon written applications of various parties, usually utilities, to estab-
lish rates and classifications. The proceedings are judicial in nature, 
in that the parties are represented by legal counsel in an adversary set-
ting. Opening statements are made regarding the law and facts. Conflic-
ting testimony of experts sworn under oath and exhibits are presented, pur-
suant to Commission rules and the Utah Rules of Evidence and Civil Procedure. 
-3-
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The testimony is usually subjected to cross-examination by the oppos-
ing legijl counsel. Legal counsel may and usually do make legal objec-
tions to testimony and motions 1·1hich must be ruled upon by appellants. 
After the presentation of the evidence, the opposing counsel make 
final summations of the law and facts, and the matter is submitted 
to appellants for deliberation and their decision. Findings of facts 
and conclusions of law, together with an order, are issued which are 
appealable on the record to the Utah Supreme Court. 
The lower court ruled in effect that appellants must deliber-
ate openly in public during the time they are called upon to v1ei9h the 
evidence and conflicting testimony to render a decision and order. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROPERTY RIGHT OF THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF 
UTAH ARE IMPAIRED IF THE QUALITY OF THE DECISION BY 
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION IS COMPROMISED BY 
ABANDONING THE ANCIENT PROCESS OF CLOSED JUDICIAL 
DELIBERATIONS AND DECISION-MAKING. 
The Open and Public r~eetings' Act (also known as the "Sunshine 
Law"), Utah Code Annotated, Section 52-4-1 (1953), ~. provides gen-
erally that every meeting be open to the public unless closed pursuant to 
statute. The Public Service Commission is not directly referred to by sai 
statute but only as its general terms may apply to any State agency or po· 
ical subdivision. 
The Public Service Commission is charged with the regulation of 
all public utilities operating in the State of Utah. Chapter 7 of Title 
54 governs hearings, practice and pi'Ocedure before the Commission. Provi· 
sian is made for complaints to be filed against public utilities as well 
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as complaints to be filed by public utilities against other parties. 
Appellant Public Service Co~mission also receives applications for 
rate structures. In hearings before the Commission on such complaints 
and applications, evidence is received and a decision is reached by 
the Commission on both the facts presented and the applicable Utah 
la1~. (Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-7-9, 10, 11, 12 and 14.) The 
rights of the parties to these hearings are adjudicated and become final 
(Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-7-14) subject only to review by the 
Utah Supreme Court. (Utah Code Annotated, Section 54-7-16) The Com-
mission conducts all its meetings and hearings in open, which the 
news media and the general public at large may observe. The hearings 
are conducted in an adversary setting with opposing legal counsel repre-
senting the various parties in interest. After the Commission has re-
ceived the legal arguments, the sworn testimony and the exhibits and 
evidence, pursuant to the Commission's rules and the Utah Rules of Evi-
dence, the Commission then retires to its chambers to deliberate the pro-
ceedings. During the deliberation, the Commission must weigh the evidence 
and determine the credibility of ~litnesses in establishing usually contro-
verted facts 11hich v10uld justify an increase in a rate structure or 
justify a complaint 1vell taken against a party. It is only the "delibera-
tions" of the Commission being conducted in an open meeting in issue in 
the instant case. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 13-1-1.3 (1953), provides, in 
part: 
-5-
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"The public service commission as established by 
54-l-l, is continued in existence with the department 
of business regulation. The public service commission 
shall not exercise administrative authority over the 
division of public utilities or over any other division 
within the department of business regulation; . . . . The 
public service commission shall not be subject to the 
jurisdiction of the executive director of business regu-
lation in regard to the exercise of its quasi-judicial 
or rule-making functions within the department, except 
that the executive director of business regulation if he 
is also a member of the public service commission shall 
participate in deliberations and decisions of the public 
service commission as may any other member. The public 
service commission shall exercise all quasi-judicial 
and rule-making powers in regard to public utilities as 
provided in Title 54 .... " (Emphasis added.) 
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that judicial 
powers may be conferred upon an administrative agency. (See Sunshine 
Anthrecite :oal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 60 S.Ct. 907, 84 L.Ed. 1263 
(1940 1 , ;,"cu,::.cruction Finance Corp. v. Bankers Trust, 318 U.S. 163, 63 S 
Ct. 515, 87 L.Ed. 680 (1943) ). 
It could not be any clearer that the Legislature intended that 
the Public Service Commission exercise functions that are quasi-judicial 
in nature and independent of the executive administrative authority of H 
Department of Business Regulation. It is, therefore, submitted that the 
specific wording of Utcth Code Annotated, Section 13-1-1.3 (1953), takes 
precedence, although earlier in point of time over the general language c 
the Open and Public Meetings' Act, in particular, Utah Code Annotated, ~ 
tion 52-4-3 (1953). !~elden v. Clark, 20 U. 382, 59 P. 524 (1899); Pacif 
Intermountain Express Co. v. State Tax Co~., 7 U.2d 15; 316 P.2d 549 (lr 
-6-
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There is no real difference in the deliberations of the Public Ser-
vice Commission than that of a jury or multi-judge court. Facts 
must be found by weighing evidence and examining exhibits, and the 
law must be applied to the facts as found. It cannot be presumed 
that the Legislature intended to include the judicial or quasi-judicial 
functions within the scope of Utah Code Annotated, Section 52-4-2 (2), 
since it repealed none of the pertinent sections of Title 54 and did 
not extend the application of the Open Meetings' Act to courts and judi-
cial functions. Had it done so there would be a serious constitutional 
question raised as to an unlawful intermeddling by the Legislature into 
the judicial po1~ers vested in the courts. The Utah Constitution, Art. 
I, Section 24, provides that all laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation. 
It is a common rule of law that the Legislature cannot delegate 
essential legislative functions. While it might be said that the Public 
Service Commission in setting utility rates and adjudicating rights of 
parties may be performing a legislative function, said function is 
either a ''nonessential" legislative function or is being performed in vio-
lation of Article IV, Section l, which vests the legislative powers of the 
State in the Senate and House of Representatives and the people. (See, 
generally, Lloyd A. Fry Co. v. Utah Air Conservation Commission, 545 P.2d 
495.) 
Accepting for purposes of argument that the essential nature of 
-7-
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the rate-making function of the CoMnission is quasi-legislative in 
substance, it certainly is clear that it performs the major rortion 
of that function through quasi-judicial procedures, rather than 
quasi-legislative procedures. It is significant that no action of 
the Legislature is appealable directly to the Supreme Court on the 
record as is the decision of the Public Service Commission in adjudicat-
ingrates and classifications. The Open and Public Meetings' statute 
deals with "procedural" rather than substantive law. Hence, the crucial 
determination is whether the procedural requirements of the Sunshine 
law may be applied to proceedings which are essentially judicial in 
nature. 
The Arizona Supreme Court decided a similar issue involving 
the con .e•c 0f e~~tcising quasi-judicial power in the case of Arizona 
Press Club, Inc. v. Arizona Board of Tax Appeals, Div. 1, 113 Ariz. 545, 
558 P.2d 697 (1976). In that case, the Arizona Press Club and Common 
Cause alleged that a three-member tax appeals commission was subject in 
their deliberations to the Open Meetings' Act. In holding that the Board 
of Tax Commissioners were not subject to the Act, the Court stated: 
"l.!1en an administrative agency is exercising its 
quasi-judicial power, it does not necessarily follow 
that it acts quasi-judicially. It either acts judi-
cially or it acts administratively. The procedures 
prescribed by the statute and followed by the board 
of tax appeals in hearing the parties in open forum, 
taking the matter under advisement, deliberating, 
writing a written decision and making that decision 
available to the parties and the public, follow the 
classic procedures of an appellate court in making a 
-8-
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judicial decision. We believe that this is a 'judi-
cial proceeding' vii thin the meaning of the statute." 
The realistic, pragmatic reasons for exempting the Public Service 
Commission from the operation of the Act are that it would be im-
possible for a commissioner within the context of his open delibera-
tions to voice to the other commissioners that he did not believe 
one witness in deference to another witness. Likewise, it would be 
difficult to admit that a commissioner in fact did not understand a 
significant phase of the proceeding, such as the application of de-
preciation rules or capitalization concepts to a rate structure. The 
free exchange of information between commissioners in weighing the 
rules of lavv applicable 1~ould not exist if said commissioner knew that 
he would be subject to political influence at the end of the term when 
the question of his appointment to office was being considered. In 
general, the consumers and citizens of the State of Utah would suffer by 
the undue influence that utilities could exercise over commissioners, 
either through the political process or through constant refinement of 
the adversary process directed towards any individual commissioners' 
predispositions. 
It is well settled that the constitutional guarantee of due 
process of law applies to proceedings which are quasi-judicial in nature. 
"The constitutional guaranty of due process of 
law applies to, and must be observed in, a~ministra­
tive as well as judicial proceedings, part1cularly 
-9-
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where such proceedings are specifically classi-
fied as judicial or quasi-judicial in nature ... 
(Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law, Section 351, 
p. 163) 
The Utah Supreme Court has also made this principle clear. 
Salt Lake County v. Public Service Commission, 29 Utah 2d 386, 510 P.2d 
923 (1973). This Court has consistently held that Commission orders 
will be set aside where fundamental due process rights have been vio-
lated. Morris v. Public Service Commission, 7 Utah 2d 167, 321 P.2d 
644 (1958). 
As already indicated, the Commission acts as a decider of 
fact and of law. The deliberation process of the Commission is identical 
to that o' 3,11 pe~it jury. It must ~leigh evidence and this most assured!. 
inclur~.c. '1' '''. n;,ination of the credibility of 1~itnesses. Imagine the 
headline if deliberations were open to the press: 
"PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION BELIEVES UTILITY 
PRES IDE I'll A BOLD-FACED LIAR." 
But, of course, such a headline would never appear because, in the pre-
sence of the public, the commissioners would not engage in an open, full 
discussion on the credibility of 1·1itnesses. An article at 75 Harvard La11 
Revie1~, 1199, points out some of the other problems involved in opening 
such deliberations to the public. Among them are: 
(l) Officials are often reluctant to request in-
formatiJn at public meetings lest they create 
a public image of ignorance. The chief 
editorial writer of the Chicaao Sun-Times 
explained it this v1ay: -- ------
-10-
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It is not so much an unwillingness to 
express public views that accounts for the 
desire for secrecy as it is the need to cover 
up just plain ignorance that so many public offi-
cials have. That is the basis for one argument 
for secret meetings that might have some validity 
In a secret meeting a public official can 
honestly confess ignorance of a subject and seek 
enlightenment from his fellow committee members and 
witnesses. He would not be able to bring himself 
to do this in a public meeting and such reluc-
tance might have an adverse effect on the pro-
ceedings." (Letter to the Harvard Law Revie1~, 
Nov. 28, 1961.) 
(2) Public officials are prone to waste time making 
speeches for the benefit of an audience. This 
could easily arise in the Public Service Commis-
sion context as commissioners would be inclined 
to attempt to justify positions they perceived as 
unpopular. 
(3) An official hesitates to abandon a view that he has 
pub 1 i c ly advocated. Once a commissioner takes a 
stand in open deliberations on a particular issue, 
it is just plain human nature to cling to that posi-
tion, even if the commissioner is later convinced 
that he or she was wrong initially. 
(4) The press tends toward "sensational" reporting. All 
too frequently newspaper stories are distorted by 
the bias of the reporter or his paper. It is not 
inconceivable that extensive coverage of this type 
could give rise to the Commission bm~ing to intense 
public pressure--pressure generated by a misinformed 
or misled public. 
Other problems associated with open deliberations were discussed 
by the 4-to-l majority of the Arizona Supreme Court in Arizona Press Club 
v. Board of Tax Appeals, supra. As previously noted, this case involved 
-11-
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a fact situation almost identical to the case at bar. The Court 
said: 
"l·ie do not believe that the legislature in-
tended to exempt only court 'judicial proceedings' 
and not administrative agency 'judicial proceedings.' 
To allow the public to attend the deliberations lead-
ing to a decision and to watch the writing of that de-
cision would not, we believe, promote the ends of jus-
tice. We agree with the dissent of Justice Dekle in the 
case of Canney v. Board of Publ. Instruction of Ala-
chua Cty., 278 So.2d 260 (Fla.l973), when he stated: 
' ... Those rights of persons and prop-
erty involved in a hearing should be pre-
served in a judicial atmosphere which is es-
sential to a fair and impartial deliberation 
upon the rights involved. To afford less in 
such a judicial type of proceeding 1·1ould be a 
deniol of due process and of a fair hearing in 
whic~ a person's rights and interests are at 
5t~ke. as much as if he were before a judicial 
~~;bunal. We might as well return to the Roman 
A•·ena for a 'thumbs up or thumbs dovm' resu 1t 
by the public clamor if we are to eliminate the 
judicial protections and safeguards in matters of 
this kind. 
* * * 
'The result of depriving an administrative 
body of free deliberation among themselves, just 
as a regular judicial body or jury may do, is to 
shut off the free flow of discussion among them 
and an exch~nqe of ideas and an open discussion of 
diFferin:J vie•,;s to the end that a fair and just re-
sult may be reached by the body based upon the evi-
dence and arguments at the hearing. Ask any juror. 
The answer 11ill be that the free interchange and 
discussion among the group is essential to a fair 
and just conclusion of the interests before them 
for decision. This is not the area in which one 
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need fear the alleged 'private deals' and ex-
traneous considerations to the matter at hand, 
so that really the asserted reason undergirdin~ 
the sunshine law is not present in a judicial 
deliberation of a matter before an administra-
tive board for a review of judicial character. 
The basic concept of the 'right of the public to 
know' is fulfilled upon reaching such a fair and 
just result which is then publicly conveyed.'" 
278 So.2d at 264-265. 
The \~yoming Supreme Court agrees v!ith these principles. In 
School District No. 9, in County of Fremont v. District Boundary Board 
in and for Fremont County, 351 P.2d 106, the Court considered the claim 
that a zoning and boundary board should be required to deliberate in pub-
. lie. The Court stated: 
"HO\vever, the very nature of the activities of 
quasi-judicial meetings be open to interested persons; 
and it has been held that even where there is no statu-
tory requirement for notice of the proposed action in 
changing a school boundary reasonable notice is required 
to be afforded to interested persons. (Citations omitted.) 
"The right of the public to be aware that the hear-
ings of such boards will take place and to present evi-
dence before them should not prohibit such boards from 
having private sessions for planning or deliberations." 
(l_g_. at 110.) 
It is important to note that respondents' claim for relief is based 
entirely on the Utah Open r~eeting Act. They claim no constitutional nor 
common-law right to attend Commission deliberations. Appellants have shown 
that parties before the Commission enjoy the constitutionally quaranteed 
right of due process of law. Appellants have also shown that an opening 
of the Commission's deliberations would surely give rise to claims of due 
process violations by such parties. Appellants, therefore, respectfully 
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submit that the right to due process of law guaranteed by Art. I, 
Section 7 of the Utah Constitution, and the 14th Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution, precludes deliberations of the Commission from 
being open to the public. The Commission should not be required to 
compromise the quality and integrity of its decisions by discussing 
and deciding the matters in open public spectacles. 
POINT II 
SECTION 54-3-21 (4), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953), 
VESTS ABSOLUTE DISCRETION IN THE COMMISSION TO 
DETERMINE WHEN INFORMATION MAY BE WITHHELD FROM 
THE PUBLIC. 
Section 54-3-21 (4), Utah Code Annotated (1953), provides: 
* * * 
''!":; Hearings or proceedings of the commis-
. ·nc ,r ~f any commissioner shall be open to the 
.. , il'lu all records of all hearings or proceed-
ings or orders, rules or investigations by the com-
mission or any commissioner shall be at all times 
open to the public; provided, that any information 
furnished the commission by a public utility or by 
any officer, agent or employee of any public utility 
may be withheld from the public whenever and during 
such tin1e as the commission may determine that it is 
for the best interests of the public to withhold such 
information. Any officer or employee of the commission 
who in violation of the provisions of this subsection 
divulges any such i nforma ti on is guilty of a mi sde-
meanor." 
It is interesting to note that this provision, the violation of 
which is a crime, was not repealed when the Legislature passed the Open 
Meetings Act. It is also interesting to note that the Commission could 
invoke this statute whenever it pleased in order to close any of its 
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deliberations. It could simply state that it was going to discuss 
the type of information specified by the statute, and that it had de-
termined that the public interest would be served by closing the meet-
ing. Inasmuch as the Legislature did not expressly repeal this pro-
vision, the Open Meeting Act must be construed to effectuate its oper-
ation consistent with the previous legislation. (Sands, Sutherland's 
Statutory Construction, Sec. 23. 10, p. 231.) 
Resrondents might argue that Section 54-3-21 (4) was impliedly 
repealed vii th the passage of the Open Meetings Act. Such an argument 
would clearly be untenable. 
"Interpretation of statutes with regard to 
the question 1·1hether they effect repeal of prior 
law by implication is conditioned by a judicially 
formulated and imposed assumption, or presumption, 
against change in the legal order. Court reports 
abound in decisions reflecting and endorsing a pre-
sumption against repeal by implication." 
(Sands, Sutherland's Statutory Construction, Sec. 
23. 10, p. 230, and a plethora of case cited thereunder.) 
73 Am.Jur. 2d, Statutes, Sections 396 and 397 provides: 
"Repeals by implication are not favored. T~us, 
an intent to repeal by implication, to be effect1ve, 
must appear clearly, manifestly, and with cogent f~rce. 
The implication of a repeal, in order to be operat1ve, 
must be necessary, or necessarily follm·l from t~e language 
used because the first or dominant statute adm1ts of no othe~ reasonable construction. Moreover, if two construc-
tions are possible, that one will be adopted which_operates 
to support the earlier act, rather than to repeal 1t by 
implication. 
"The courts will not presume that the legislature 
intended a repeal by implication. Indeed, the presump-
tion is always against the intention to repeal where express 
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terms are not used, and where effect can reasonably 
be given to both statutes. The presumption rests on the 
improbability of a change of intention, or, if such 
change occurred, on the probability that the legislature 
would have expressed it with an express repeal of the 
first." (Footnotes omitted.) 
The Legislature provided the Commission with a vehicle by 
which it could keep information secret. That vehicle has not been re-
pealed, either expressly or impliedly. 
POINT III 
DECISIONS OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS SUPPORT APPELLANTS' 
POSITION THAT THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION IS EXEMPT 
FROM THE OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS' ACT DURING ITS JUDI-
CIAL "DELIBERATIONS." 
There appear to be many cases across the country reaching oppo· 
site CO!':':,cio:ls CJn the applicability of the Open l•ieetings' Act in genera 
to co:.,,•oS:t.'llo v1hich exercise highly visible judicial functions, such as 
appellant Public Service Con~ission. Appellants submit that the better-
reasoned position is that the Public Service Commission, in following j~ 
cial procedures and exercising a judicial function which the Legislature 
would be required to do itself if it were setting rates, is exempt from 
the operation of the Open and Public Meetings' Act in order to preserve· 
integrity of the jujicial process: 
In Canney v. Board of Public Instruction of Alachua County, (I 
278 So. 2d 260, three justices dissented from the four-judge majority, he 
ing that even though the school board v1as acting in a "quasi-judicial" c 
city in deciding \'lhether a student's suspension should be continued, thE 
board was a part of the legislative branch of C'JOVern,nent and the "Sunsh' 
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La1'1'' was violated 1-1hen the board recessed the hearing to reach a de-
cision. The majority concluded that as a general rule administrative 
agencies have no general judicial powers, notwithstanding they may per-
form some quasi-judicial duties, and, under the separation of powers doctrine, 
the Legislature may not authorize officers or bodies to exercise powers 
which are essentially judicial in their nature. The Court stated that 
the characterization of a decisional-making process by an administrative 
board as "quasi-judicial" does not make the body into a judicial body, and 
that the intent of the Legislature in passing the "Sunshine Law" was to 
cover any gathering of some of the members of a public board where those 
members discuss some matters on which foreseeable official action will be 
taken by the board. 
The dissent in Canney argued that "Lt_!he Legislature itself has 
recognized its grant of quasi-judicial powers to various boards and agen-
cies as 'something apart' from those agencies' principal functions, and that 
they are to be treated in a different manner." 278 So. 2d at 264. The dis-
sent illustrated this point by noting that the Legislature adopted the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, ~1hich provided for the procedure regulating 
the exercise of quasi-judicial power by the agencies (much like court rules). 
The dissent stated that: 
" ... It is apparent that such distinctive qua~i­
judicial activity was never intended t? ~e.m~lded 1nto 
an agency's regular duties and respons1b1l~t1~s and . 
thereby treated in a 'nonjudicial' manner ~n 1ts cons~­
deration. I believe that the Legislature 1s as consc1ous 
as anyone in preserving private rights and due process of 
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individuals who may come before a board or agency, and 
that the Legislature intended to insure that those rights 
were afforded in accordance with due process in a judi-
cious manner, as reflected by adoption of the 1id1ninis-
trative Procedure Act for state agencies. 
"The regular activities of an agency and those 1'1hich 
are quasi-judicial are altogether different. Those rights 
of persons and property involved in a hearing should be pre-
served in a judicial atmosphere which is essential to a 
fair and impartial deliberation upon the rights involved. 
To afford less in such a judicial type of proceeding would be 
a denial of due process and of a fair hearing in which a per-
son's rights and interests are at stake, as much as if he 
were before a judicial tribunal ... " 
278 So.2d at 264. (Dissent) 
The dissent further stated that it is not necessary to have an express 
exception in the "Sunshine Law," but that the quasi-judicial function 
stands independently without having to be excepted anymore than courts, 
as juJi' -.~ 1-- ··:e' need to be express exceptions to that lav1. 
This is recognized as the judicial protection 
basically afforded to all persons. The simple fact that 
such quasi-judicial proceedings are not fully judicial 
does not deprive them of their basic constitutional protec-
tions and safeguards to the individuals or properties in-
volved in that type of proceeding. And it is fully judi-
cial for the particular proceeding, insofar as the matter 
involved is concerned." 
278 So.2d at 265. (Dissent) 
According to the dissent, it is unnecessary 
" ... that adr~inistrative agencies beco,ne actual ful-
fledged judicial bodies in order to function in a judi-
cial atmosphere. To hold otherwise diminishes the consti-
tutional right to a judicial consideration by quasi-judi-
cial bodies in matters fully as important as those which may 
come before a full-fledged judiciary. They do not change 
in their importance and protection by virtue of being heard 
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by a body 1~hose regular duties are otherwise, when 
that body convenes in a proceeding which is judicial 
in nature. If this is not recognized it will destroy 
the traditional quasi-judicial functions of enumerable 
bodies and important agencies considering questions of 
vital and far-reaching effect." 
278 So. 2d at 265. (Dissent) 
The dissent expressed the fear that the majority holding would invite 
Federal intrusion in areas where the state would be neglecting the con-
stitutional rights and privileges of those persons and property in-
terests involved in quasi-judicial hearings or proceedings. It 1·1as 
also feared that the open exchange of views and a free flow of expression 
mig:1t be cut off if the administrative body was deprived of free del iber-
ation among its members. It was contended that the free interchange and 
discussion among the members are essential to a fair and just conclusion 
of the interests before them for discussion. The dissent concluded that: 
" ... This is not the area in which one need fear the 
alleged 'private deals' and extraneous considerations to 
the matter at hand, so that really the asserted reason under-
girding the sunshine law is not present in a judicial de-
liberation of a matter before an administrative board for a 
review of judicial character. The basic concept of the 'right 
of the public to know' is fulfilled upon reaching such a fair 
and just result which is then publicly conveyed. 
"The quasi-judicial function, wherever it is exercised, 
is 'primarily' and indeed totally involved at that moment 
by any such board, commission or agency. The quasi-judicial 
board must therefore be allowed such independence as may be 
necessary to meet the minimum criteria of due process. This 
is my earlier and fundamental premise for all01~ing the ~re~ 
exchange in such bodies' deliberations on matters of a JUdl-
cial nature. Although such quasi-judicial boa~ds_are not a 
part of the judicial branch of government, the1r 1ndependence 
in making decisions must be preserved." 
278 So.2d at 265. (Dissent) 
-19-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The Court in Jordan v. District of Columbia, (D.C. Ct. of 
App., Aug. 3, 1976), 362 A.2d 114, specifically rejected the major-
ity position in Canney, supra, and accepted the dissenting opinion. 
A metropolitan police department's denial of an application for a 
license to carry a concealed pistol 1~as affirmed by the board of ap-
peals and reviewed at a nonpublic conference, of v1hich no transcript v1as 
made. The petitioner-applicant argued, in addition to other points, 
that the board failed to comply with the "Sunshine Act." The Court re-
jected the argument by stating that the statute pertains to all offi-
cial actions of an executive or legislative nature, but does not apply 
to adjudicatu~;-type ~earings. The Court was not persuaded by Canney, 
supri., i>1 ; -,.~, .· · tatu':e similar to the one in question was held to app: 
to quasi-judicial as v1ell as quasi-legislative deliberations. The Court 
agreed with the Canney dissent and quoted at length from the minority 
opinion. The Court concluded by stating that: 
"There can be no question that the case before us 
for review was an agency adjudicatory proceeding, in 
contradistinction to a legislative or quasi-legislative 
action. Cf. Hotel Association v. District of Columbia 
Minimum Wa e and Industrial Safet Board, D.C. A p., 
318 A.2d 294 1974 . As it is our considered opinion 
that the deliberative process incident to final orders 
in such proceedings is not covered by the so-called 
'sunshine' amendment, it follows that the challenged 
orders in this case are not defective either because the 
Board members arrived at their decision at a nonpublic 
conference or because no transcript of such conference was 
made .... " 
262 A.2d at 119. 
The holding in Jordan, supra, on this point 1·1as follm·1ed and 
cited as controlling in: Bernstein v. District of Columbia Board of Zon 
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Adjustment, (D.C. Ct. of App., July 13, 1977) 376 A.2d 816; Dupunt 
Circle Citizens Assoc. v. D.C. Board of Zoning Adjustment, (D.C. Ct. 
of App., 1976) 364 A.2d 610. 
The Court in Dupont Circle Citizens Assoc., supra, reviewing 
orders of the Board of Zoning Adjustment made in a closed executive 
meeting allegedly in violation of the "Sunshine Act," followed Jordan, 
supra, and said that: 
"The quasi-judicial function of an administrative 
agency differs completely from the nature of its other 
activities. The personal and property rights of the 
parties, at issue in such proceedings, can only be pro-
tected, under the American system, in a judicial atmos-
phere that assures freedom of expression to each decid-
ing official and encourages a free discussion and exchange 
of views which is so essential to frank and impartial deliber-
ation. 
"This court recently interpreted the Sunshine Act in 
Jordan v. District of Columbia, D.C. App., 362 A.2d 114 
(1976). We held there that to open all meetings to the pub-
1 ic 1·10uld effectively prevent the frank exchange of views 
in private among members of quasi-judicial agencies in reach-
ing a decision--thus putting them on an entirely different 
footing from appellate courts and juries--to say nothing of 
federal administrative agencies--where experience has shown 
that the free flow of discussion unimpeded by the presence or 
reactions of the parties to the controversy has encouraged 
fair and just results. 362 A.2d at 117. 
"The Jordan decision is controlling as to the application 
of the Sunshine Act." 
364 A.Zd at 613,614. 
The Court held that there was no violation of the "Sunshine Act" in that 
the Act was not applicable to quasi-judicial functions of an administra-
tive agency or board. 
-21-
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The Court in Arizona Press Club, Inc., v. Arizona Board of 
Tax AppcJls, Div. (1976), supra, also fully accepted the Canney dis-
sent. r~embers of the Board of Tax Appeals had a procedure ~1hereby they 
heard the parties in open forum, took the matter under advisement, de-
liberated, wrote a decision, then made that decision available to parties 
and the public. The Court determined that the Board was invclved in a 
"judicial proceeding" within the meaning of a statutory provision that 
provisions of the open meeting law shall not apply to any judicial pro-
ceeding, and that the term "judicial proceeding" 1~ithin the Act includes 
administrc.tive itgency judicial proceedings. The Court, in quoting Batty 
v. Arizon< )~cte D~c:ntal Board, 57 Ariz. 239, 112 P.2d 870 (191\1), stated 
that J~ ·,e agency may be said to have quasi-judicial power 
in that it possesses both judicial and administrative powers. It is im-
portant to note that Batty applied the Utah rule of administrative agencie! 
exercising quasi-judicial functions. The Court said that: 
"\~e do not believe that the legislature intended to 
exempt 011ly court 'judicial proceedings' and not adminis-
trative agency 'judicial proceedings.' To allow the public 
to attend the deliberations leading to a decision and to 
watch the writing of that decision would not, we believe, 
promote the ends of justice. We agree with the dissent of 
Justice Dekle in the case uf ca.mey v. 3oard of Publ. Instruc-
tion of Alachua Cty., 278 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1973) ... 
558 P.2d at 699. 
The Court held "that the exemption in the open meeting la1~ as to judicial 
proceedings applies to the Arizona Board of Tax Appeals when they are act-
ing judicially, and that the open meeting law does not require the Arizona 
Board of Tax Appeals to deliberate and make their decisions in public." 
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court, in Stillwater Savings & Loan 
Association v. Oklahoma Savings and Loan Board (1975), 534 P.2d 9, 
in reviewing a decision of the Oklahoma Savings and Loan Board made 
in a meeting where the appellant was not present nor advised of, de-
termined that the "Open Meeting Law" does not include hearings before 
the Board when it acts in a quasi-judicial manner in an individual 
proceeding. The Court reasoned that there is no need for the "deci-
sion" to be reached in open session, and that the final decision, being 
quasi-judicial action, is not required to be reached in an open meeting. 
The concurring judge in State of Missouri ex rel. Phillip Tran-
sit Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Commission (1977), 552 S\~ 2d 696, 703, 
stated that: 
I wish to expressly reserve the right to de-
cide, when it is presented, the question whether the 
Sunshine Law applies in situations where the Commission 
is exercising a quasi-judicial function and constitutional 
rights of privacy and due process are involved. See dis-
senting opinion of Dekle, Justice, in Canney v. Board of 
Public Instruction of Alachua County, Florida, 278 So.2d 
264 (Fla. 1978)." 
The majority, without discussion, agreed with the Public Service Commission's 
position in its brief that the Open Meetings Law applies to it. 
Various Law Review articles have dealt with the issues before this 
Court. In addition to the Harvard Law Review article, cited, supra, 68 
Northwestern Univ. Law Review 480, 1973, provides: 
481-482 
"Let the Sunshine In~" Douglas Q. Wickham 
"We must concede, however, that there are limits to 
'Government in the Sunshine,' especially in the early 
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stages of working out a particular problem. It makes 
a good deal of sense for any governmental body to re-
t~in a zone of privacy within which its members can air 
internal disagreer11ents. A position, once publicly taken, 
is not easily changed; and it seems undes i rab 1 e to encourage 
the adoption of 'first thoughts' by requiring that all col-
lective governmental thinking be done in public. Few sub-
ordinates would feel free to offer constructive ideas for 
fear of appearing to be in opposition to the eventual de-
cision of the final authority. The value competing against 
'a right to kn0\'1' then is not a 'right to secrecy,' but an 
assurance of some insulation from the intense heat of pub-
lic pressure. Pricrities must be determined, decisions 
made, and program~ implemented. Absolute openness will de-
tract from the overall public interest in informed and 
rational governmental decisions." 
CONCLUSION 
It is L•ndeniable that the Commission perfor'ms functions which 
are qu.1c,i-judicial in nature. The Open Heetings' Act, by its 0\vn terms, 
-, :h Judicial and quasi-judicial functions. Furthermore, case 
law in other jurisdictions indicates that quasi-judicial bodies cannot 
be compelled to open deliberations to the public. It should also be noted 
that the Harvard La\v Revie\v article cited above specifically recommends thr 
quasi-judicial bodies be exer~pted from open meeting acts. 
Exposure of Commission deliberations to the pressures of the pub-
lic would sever,ely limit th" free flo•,1 of ideas and discussion essential 
among deliberating commissioners and \vould compromise the quality of decisi• 
to the detriment of citizens of Utah. Such a 1 imitation may very we 11 give 
rise to a denial of due process of law to the parties before the Commissior 
It is of interest to note that the Founding Fathers conducted the delibera-
tions leading to the Constitution of the United States in secret: 
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The debates were secret, and fortunately 
so, for criticism from without might have imperilled 
... /the/ work ... so great were the difficulties en-
countered from the divergent sentiments and interests 
of different parts of the country... . " I Bryce, 
The American Commonwealth 24 (2d ed. 1908)) 
Finally, the Legislature has expressed an intention that the 
Commission keep certain information secret, whenever the Commission deems 
it in the public interest. This statute must be read consistently with 
the Open 11eetings' Act. The District Court Ruling should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT;B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
1 1.._ ~ / 
MICHAEL L. DEAMER 
Deputy Attorney General 
JOSEPH P. McCARTHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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